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 cc in SR/Plans

DRAFT ☐ 7'ph
 12 July 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT: Unconventional Warfare Requirements in Denied Areas

REFERENCES:

- A. NSC 5412/2
- B. Criteria Paper - 1955
- C. SM-599-56, dated 17 July 1956, Subject: Review of Unconventional Warfare Requirements
- D. SM-1079-58, dated 27 October 1959, Subject: Unconventional Warfare Requirements
- E. Excerpt from DD/P Staff Meeting Minutes - 31 August 1961
- F. Memo for DD/P, dated 14 September 1961, Subject: Project USEFUL and Related UW Requirements Placed upon CIA
- G. Memo for C/WPS, dated 18 September 1961, Subject: Same as "F" above
- H. Memo for DD/P, dated 20 December 1961, Subject: Proposal for Exchange of Views with Elements of DOD and JCS in Regard to UW Assets in Denied Areas (with Attached Proposal)
- I. Memo for the Record, dated 25 June 1962, Subject: Exchange of Views with ☐ and Members of his Staff Regarding the Establishment of UW Assets in Denied Areas within the EUCOM Area of Responsibility (with Attachments)
- J. Memo for the Record, dated 27 June 1962, Subject: CIA UW Denied Area Problem and Proposals

1. This memorandum recommends action by the DDCI, as noted in paragraph 5 below.

2. General: CIA's inability to produce UW agent assets in denied areas to meet wartime military unconventional wartime requirements has long been a matter of concern to the JCS, to individual Officers in the field with whom CIA has planning relationships, and to CIA itself.

3. Background:

a. NSC 5412/2 assigns to CIA the responsibility for the development of covert assets, including, whenever practicable, provision of a base upon which the Military may expand in time of war. Further, in the Criteria Paper of 1956, CIA informed the Military of its intention to create and maintain assets to support military operations.

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b. In July 1958, JCS asked CIA to accept requirements to provide war-time UW support to the unified and specified commands. Subsequently, CIA began accepting unconventional warfare requirements from the JCS, based upon theater war plans. The original requirements and acceptances have been revised and refined through three cycles, i. e., 1957 original requirements and first cycle, 1959 second cycle, and 1960 third cycle.

c. In reviewing our acceptances of requirements during the above three cycles, one major problem clearly emerges and that is our inability to develop and maintain in-place agent assets in denied areas in CINCEUR's area of responsibility. We mention CINCEUR's area, because the operational climate within the denied areas of Europe is quite different from that encountered in other areas. Then, too, the JCS have addressed themselves to the EUCOM area in their comments on our ability to accept UW requirements. Therefore, this paper considers the following European countries as denied areas and restricts discussion to those countries: Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, and European USSR.

d. In 1957, CINCEUR requirements for denied areas totaled 64. CIA accepted 44. Of the 44, 9 were in place, 1 was programmed in place, and 34 were to be held externally. The 70 percent acceptance was evidently satisfactory to JCS, because we have no record of adverse comments. This is not true, however, for the 1959 cycle. In that cycle, there were 90 UW requirements for denied areas. CIA accepted 65, or 70 percent. The percentage of acceptance was the same as the previous cycle, but our acceptance against assets in place and ready had dropped to 3, i. e., 2 in East Germany and 1 in Poland. In our memorandum of acceptance to the JCS, we indicated to them that we had programs to develop 8 additional assets in place--4 in Czechoslovakia and 4 in East Germany. Forty-one acceptances were based upon agent assets located in the CONUS. JCS, in their SM-1079-59, were critical of CIA's acceptances of CINCEUR's requirements. They pointed out that a large portion of the assets was located in CONUS and not readily available to provide an acceptable D-day capability.

JCS requested that CIA initiate new programs where applicable to assure that assets developed for Priority I UW areas be located, if possible, within the area of potential operations or, as a minimum, within the geographical area of responsibility of the commander concerned. In 1960, CINCEUR's requirements for denied areas dropped to 68. CIA accepted 38, or 53 percent. Of this total, 1 was located in Poland, 33 in CONUS, and 2 in Western Europe.

e. In view of our record in regard to acceptances of military UW requirements and the continuing concern of the JCS, it was recognized in August 1961 that CIA should take the initiative and attempt to arrive at a mutual understanding with JCS as to our capabilities to accept military UW requirements in denied areas and, in so doing, to provide a positive and practicable solution. To this end, C/WPS briefed the DD/P (Mr. Bissell) and Area Division Chiefs on the problem. At the conclusion of the briefing, Mr. Bissell stated that we needed frank discussion with the JCS of the impracticability of planning for in-place assets. Within the framework of Mr. Bissell's statement, C/WPS suggested the problem be discussed with JCS. In his response to C/WPS, DDPASST asked that C/WPS work out a tentative proposal to the Pentagon. The memorandum also stated that the proposal should consider:

- (1) The infeasibility of CIA or any other agency to hold agents on ice in denied areas against a hot war.

- (2) The only internal assets who might be available for use in a hot war are those who are currently held and employed in operational tasks.

- (3) We must place our reliance upon externally held assets to be employed as complementary to Special Forces.

- (4) We propose to recruit personnel in CONUS and possibly some foreign countries and form them into a sort of reserve corps to be used with either Special Forces or for CIA missions.

f. After several conferences, C/WPS developed and coordinated a proposal for an exchange of views with JCS. The proposal was approved by the DD/P. C/WPS emphasized that the proposal of placing major reliance upon externally

held assets would call for an increase of effort on the part of CIA, and suggested that the sound and energetic DOB of ER, expanded as to capability and advanced as to readiness, could accomplish all tasks. In regard to the expansion of capability, current requirements for denied countries in CDCEUR's area of responsibility total 68. Of this total, 51 are Priority I and 17 Priority II. Of the total, CIA has accepted 27 in USSR based upon 73 agent assets recruited and trained by ER/DOB and held in CONUS. No assets are available, and CIA has not accepted 10 UW targets in Czechoslovakia, 6 in East Germany, 3 in Hungary, and 9 in Poland. To overcome this short fall, CIA should recruit and train 84 satellite-type agent assets. In regard to advancement of readiness, it is considered that, in order to achieve meaningful readiness, CIA should prepare detailed plans for: alerting and assembling externally held agent assets, stockpiling of clothing, material and equipment, documentation, overseas reception, clandestine communications, case officers, final briefings, and assignment of missions. As a matter of interest, WPS has discussed these planning requirements with ER, OC, OS, DPD, EE, and FE ^{and WPRE} and, at the present time, is developing planning guidance for Area Divisions concerned.

g. C/WPS and his Deputy discussed on an informal basis the proposal with ☐ SACSA, and his Staff on 15 June 1962. ☐ agreed that it was impracticable to establish UW assets in denied areas and accepted, in principle, the alternative of having these assets held externally. In his informal and uncleared memorandum for the record of the meeting with SACSA, C/WPS pointed out ☐ ready acceptance of the hard facts and his desire to see something in being, which, although not ideal, would be a firm capability. C/WPS also reiterated a previous point that JCS acceptance of major reliance upon externally held assets will call for an increase in CIA capabilities and will require considerable planning and organization, both in CONUS and Western Europe by CIA, and to some extent CDCEUR, in order to achieve meaningful readiness.

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4. Proposal:

a. On 27 June 1962, C/WPS was called by ☐ ☐ (SACSA Staff), who stated he was returning the proposal statement with no comment. In response to questioning, ☐ ☐ indicated that the JCS are prepared to accept the paper as a statement of fact and a reasonable solution to the problem. ☐

☐ further commented that he did not know whether the proposal would be acceptable as it moved in a formalized shape up the line, but he noted that

☐ ☐ had accepted the paper in principle.

b. It is proposed that the CIA paper on externally held assets be officially forwarded to JCS for their study and comment. Attached at Tab A is a suggested memorandum from the DDCI to the Chairman, JCS, forwarding the paper.

5. Recommendation: It is recommended that the DDCI sign the memorandum for the Chairman, JCS, attached at Tab A.

☐ ☐
Chief, War Plans Staff

1 Attachment:
Tab A, as stated

COORDINATION:

SR	Date
EE	Date
FE	Date
WE	Date
NE	Date
CA/PMG	Date

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Proposal for Exchange of Views with Elements of the
HOD and JIC in Regard to UW Assets in Selected Areas
within the EUCOM Area of Responsibility

1. NSC 5412/1 gives the CIA responsibility for covert operations and lists the types of actions to be accomplished. In part this Directive states, "In accordance with established policies and to the extent practicable in areas dominated or threatened by International Communism, develop underground resistance and facilitate covert and guerrilla operations and ensure availability of these forces in the event of war, including wherever practicable provision of a base area which the military may expand these forces in time of war for established assets and evasion and escape facilities." In military terminology, UW consists of Guerrilla Warfare, Evasion and Escape, and Subversion (resistance).

2. With the advent of the Special Forces (SF) program in the Army, and the development of an Evasion and Escape (E&E) program by the Air Force, military requirements for CIA covert action support increased. The Army and the Air Force have indicated that their respective programs would be greatly facilitated if the CIA could provide assets within selected

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areas which, upon the outbreak of hostilities, would be expected to undertake UW tasks in support of military operations.

3. In responding to Military UW Requirements in the past, CIA has listed four types of assets which it could reasonably be expected to provide. These are:

a. Action nuclei located where possible within the area of potential operations, equipped with communications and supporting facilities, and trained to perform a specific type of UW task, i.e., Guerrilla Warfare, Evacuation, Sabotage, or Subversion.

b. General-purpose organizations located within the area of operations with communications and the capability to gather operational intelligence and report back to headquarters, normally personnel for the requirements to be met.

c. Assets of a supporting character who are able to provide limited support to responsible elements of the Armed Services within the operational area. Such assets are not capable of undertaking specific UW tasks but can provide local information, establish contact with the local resistance potential, or provide safe haven or communications facilities and services.

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4. Where pre-war intelligence of assets is available to the denied area is not possible. In such cases, assets are held against the current needs of the denied area and are not available for use in the operational area.

The JCS, after making an assessment of these assets, stated their preference for a, b and c assets in that order. With regard to external assets, the JCS consider that for those to be considered effective for Priority I operations (D-Day), they should be held within the theater where they would be readily available.

4. In 1959 the number of UW requirements submitted to the CIA by USCSCHUR totaled 122, of which 80 were for assets in denied areas. Of the denied area requirements CIA accepted 45, 10 against assets in being and 35 against programmed assets. In 1960 total requirements dropped to 118, of which 68 were in denied areas. Of the latter, CIA accepted 35 against current assets and 10 against programmed assets. Of the 23 accepted, 24 were accepted against externally held assets. One requirement was accepted against an asset in place in a denied area. Requirements based on programmed assets are of little value for current operational planning unless their programmed readiness date falls within the planning date of the Military Plan (1 July - 30 June). CIA experience in the past has been that in more than 80% of the cases the programmed readiness date was not met. As a result, changes have been made in asset development

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Current restrictions make this almost impossible. The most that is allowed is "perimeter" reconnaissance. In some cases, the other hand, if he is allowed to operate in the area. However, the most vulnerable factor is the lack of a means of control. The validity of such assets must be proved. In summary, it does not appear feasible for CIA or any other agency to establish EW assets to any meaningful number in areas to be held for wartime use.

4. It is therefore proposed that:

a. It is unlikely in the present circumstances that there will be any improvement over that performance is required to achieve. However, if current EW assets in areas to be held for wartime use are to be maintained, it is suggested that the following be considered:

b. Priority of effort will be given to the existing assets having a current capability however, plans will be made to permit their conversion to wartime missions. Existing EW assets will be maintained when appropriate.

It has been CIA experience, however, that the life span of current assets is uncertain and it is not possible to predict with any degree of accuracy which

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will still be available on the subject of personnel.

a. The development of internal assets to be conducted in the operational area of operations, which includes the development of assets, will be continued and augmented as required. Major reliance for the fulfillment of PW tasks will be placed on these assets.

Although it is a costly procedure in terms of personnel and money, this method is considered to have advantages over assets developed and used internally. These are: They are not subject to recruitment; they can be trained for the job; they are in position to act, with proper attention to security factors, undertake joint training with military units if such is indicated; and they will be available at the time needed.

With regard to the development of externally held assets, CIA proposes to develop singular assets or small teams of two or more men who would be infiltrated into the operational area prior to the Special Forces Teams. These assets would be complementary to the Special Forces and would be able to serve as guides and interpreters when they would have fluency in the language used.

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operation of the arm. CIA has been working to build a reserve pool of agents and personnel for operations in the future. At the present time, the CIA has a small number of agents in the field, and it is working to build up this pool. In addition, CIA is working to improve its operational capabilities, and it is working to improve its intelligence capabilities. CIA is also working to improve its support functions, and it is working to improve its logistical capabilities. CIA is currently expanding its pool of agent assets and reviewing and improving the readiness of existing assets. In addition, plans are being worked out to enable CIA with military support to transport U.S. held agents quickly to the overseas staging areas.

4. CIA will continue to review all current internal agents to determine their wartime EW potential. The broad EW requirement will be considered in connection with recruitment of new agents for current use.

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